My take on the majority opinion: Disappointing, but not surprising, given arguments like, "Some amici, however, suggest that the statute can be read to permit same-sex marriage, thus mooting the constitutional issues. We find this suggestion untenable. ... New York's statutory law clearly limits marriage to opposite-sex couples. The more serious question is whether that limitation is consistent with the New York Constitution." That whopper came from the amicus brief of NGLTF, unless I'm mistaken as to its source. With arguments like that, who needs opposition briefs?
The majority then return to their opening theme: "We hold that the New York Constitution does not compel recognition of marriages between members of the same sex. Whether such marriages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the Legislature." Phrasing the issue as whether NY's Constitution compels, not just permits, almost makes the outcome preordained.
But I continue to wonder why what follows, if granted equally to us under some name other than "marriage," is anything less than substantively equal: "Married people receive significant tax advantages, rights in probate and intestacy proceedings, rights to support from their spouses both during the marriage and after it is dissolved, and rights to be treated as family members in obtaining insurance coverage and making health care decisions. Beyond this, they receive the symbolic benefit, or moral satisfaction, of seeing their relationships recognized by the State." In fact, apart from the tax advantages, which too many gay "activists" have deliberately chosen NOT to pursue because they see them as some sort of "backsliding," most of these benefits are already part of domestic partner benefits in states like CA that have them.
The majority's analysis under traditional rational basis grounds is proper, reasoned and just - and thankfully free of the polemics found in other such decisions, the briefs leading up to them, or the
petulant press releases following them. Again, it is not what NY's Constitution compels, but what it and its legislature allows as a result of rational debate. The same applies to its finding that the Legislature could find that heterosexual parenting is optimal, and that fostering such parenting by limiting marriage to such couples is proper. Again, the Legislature could just as well have adopted the Brandeis-brief arguments and their somewhat sparse support, but just because it chose not to - assuming they were provided with them in lieu of litigation - does not mean it acted irrationally or discriminatorily.
Disappointing as it may sound, the historical fact - marrying monks and other alleged examples notwithstanding - is that the concept of gay marriage is NOT historically rooted in our culture and traditions. There is no error in limiting the definition of the fundamental right to marry to heterosexual marriage; those are the kinds of marriages that caused the marriage right to be recognized as fundamental in the first place. Of all the various legal regimes, constitutional interpretation must be the most careful and exacting, lest it be overextended and abused; see Roe v. Wade, which despite its slim underpinnings and wide overbreadth does not undo my belief that the right to reproductive choice is a fundamental one. We see many examples of this in the law, as in the focus in qualified immunity analysis on the nature of the specific right claimed, not its generalized sense. The majority's defining the right this way is consistent with this analysis - and does not preclude the Legislature from expanding the scope of marriage should it choose to.
Thus, the majority was correct to state that "Plaintiffs here do not, as the petitioners in Lawrence did, seek protection against State intrusion on intimate, private activity. They seek from the courts access to a State-conferred benefit that the Legislature has rationally limited to opposite-sex couples." The distinction is a legally valid one, however distasteful it may be to even those in the legal profession. It should not be cause to leave, however; just a lesson in picking one's battles better and deploying the forces at your command with greater skill - if not in declining assistance from unskilled irregulars as well.
Edited to add post-prandial postscript on concurrence and dissent: J. Graffeo's opinion is as clear a primer on constitutional reasoning as you'll find anywhere. CJ Kaye's dissent is valuable for its discussion of why gays should be considered a suspect class, which is where I've been arguing we need to go for at least a decade.
[ July 06, 2006, 03:55 PM: Message edited by: gmginsfo ]